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ARGUMENT
L

THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL.
The City's assertion that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal is

categorically without merit. This Court has already ruled that it has subject matter
jurisdiction over this appeal, and rejected the very argument which the City again asserts
when this Court denied the City's motion for summary disposition. [12/29/05 Order
(attached as Exhibit A).] The Court's ruling is squarely supported by the governing Utah
authority, and the City's re-argument to the contrary does nothing to change this result.
This Court, as it already expressly ruled, has jurisdiction over this appeal because
the district court ruled on the constitutionality of the Ordinance as applied to Mr. Orvis.
[12/29/05 Order (holding this Court has jurisdiction because Mr. Orvis "is appealing the
constitutionality of an ordinance as applied to him") (emphasis added).] In cases where
an appeal is brought from the justice court to the district court for a trial de novo, the
district court's decision may be appealed if "the district court rules on the
constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.v Utah Code. Ann. § 78-5-120(7) (2004)
(emphasis added). An appellate court has jurisdiction to hear such an appeal if the district
court ruled on the constitutionality of an ordinance as applied to the defendant. South
Salt Lake City v. Terkelson. 2002 UT App. 405,fflf6-7, 61 P.3d 282, 284. Terkelson is

1

directly on point, is the governing law, and is dispositive of this issue.1
The City's attempt to re-argue the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in its Brief
improperly attempts to circumvent the procedures required for the Court to reconsider its
previous ruling.2 The appropriate method for challenging an appellate court's previous
determination relative to whether it has jurisdiction is by filing a petition for rehearing.
Utah R. App. P. 35; see also Larsen v. Larsen, 674 P.2d 116, 116 (Utah 1983)
(reconsidering the court's prior determination relative to jurisdiction after granting
appellant's petition for rehearing). A court will not grant a rehearing of "points of law or
fact which the petitioner claims the court has overlooked or misapprehended" in the
absence of a petition for rehearing, and a petition for rehearing must be filed "within 14
days after the entry of the decision of the court." Utah R. App. P. 35(a).
This Court denied the City's motion for summary disposition and determined that
it had subject matter jurisdiction in its Order dated December 29, 2005. If the City
wished for the Court to reconsider its determination, the City was required to file a
petition for rehearing by January 12, 2006. Having not done so, the City's renewed
attempt to have the Court reconsider its decision should be rejected, and this Court's prior
*For an in-depth treatment of Terkelson and its application to this case, Mr. Orvis
directs the Court's attention to Mr. Orvis's opposition to the City's motion for summary
disposition, which was filed with the Court on December 16, 2005.
2

Mr. Orvis requested costs and attorney's fees in opposing the City's motion for
summary disposition, which request was denied. [12/29/05 Order.] The City's
inappropriate attempt to re-assert its jurisdictional argument in its briefing for plenary
presentation of this case may warrant an award of costs and fees. Utah R. App. P. 33.
2

ruling should be treated as law of the case. Cf Salt Lake Citv Corp. v. James
Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that motions to
reconsider are disfavored and, "[o]nce the judge has decided, the system assumes he or
she has decided correctly and would decide the same way again").3
Furthermore, even if this Court were to consider the City's re-argument, the City
wholly fails to provide a basis on which to vacate the Court's previous ruling.
1.

The City's argument that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal

because Mr. Orvis allegedly did not raise the constitutionality of the Ordinance in the
justice court is without merit because the issue was raised in the district court. The City
flatly misstates the law by asserting the constitutionality of an ordinance must be raised in
the justice court. The City's reliance on State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d 273 (Utah Ct. App.
1998), is wholly misplaced because Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 has since been twice
amended and repealed as the result of a clear legislative effort to debunk the very notion
the City now asserts. Section 78-5-120, as amended, governs this appeal.
In 1997, the Utah State Legislature amended section 78-5-120 to "suggest[] a party

3

Moreover, the City misconstrues the rule that "subject matter jurisdiction may be
raised at any time." Fisher v. Fisher. 2003 UT App 91, TJ155 67 P.3d 1055, 1058. This
concept is based largely on the principle that the defense of lack of "subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, Tj 34, 100 P.3d 1177, 1186;
accord Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2). Certainly, a party may not be deprived, by waiver or
otherwise, of its right to raise the issue of subject matter jurisdiction for the first time on
appeal. However, this does not, as the City seems to assert, translate into the right to
repeatedly and continuously raise the issue after this Court has already determined it does
have subject matter jurisdiction.
3

could raise the issue in the district court in the de novo proceedings/'4 Hinson, 966 P.2d
at 275 n.2. In 2001, the Utah State Legislature repealed and reenacted section 78-5-120
in order to "clarif[y] the circumstances under which a person or the prosecutor may
appeal/' S.B. 128, 54th Leg., Gen. Sess., 2001 Utah Laws 7. As part of its clarification,
the legislature replaced section 78-5-120fs previous wording, "unless the court rules on
the constitutionality," with "unless the district court rules on the constitutionality/'5 IcL
This change clearly demonstrates the Legislature's intent that the decision of the district
court may be appealed if the district court rules on the constitutionality of an ordinance.6

4

Section 78-5-120 never explicitly stated that it was the justice court that had to
rule on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. In fact, even the 1997 Amendment
merely stated that the court must rule on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance.
H.B. 323, 52nd Leg., Gen. Sess., 1997 Utah Laws 215, § 17. Therefore, it is no surprise
that, a short time later, the legislature again amended the section to correct this ambiguity.
5

The City's reliance on Hinson is further misplaced because the Hinson court
based its decision on Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(12)(a)'s statement that the
"decision of the district court is final, except when the validity or constitutionality of a
statute or ordinance is raised in the justice court.'*' Hinson, 966 P.2d at 275-76. The City
fails to mention that "Former Rule 26, relating to appeals in criminal cases, was repealed
effective April 1,1999." Utah R. Crim. P. 26, historical notes (emphasis added). The
current provisions in the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure relevant to justice courts,
including Rule 38, make no mention of any such requirement. Rule 38 merely provides
that "[ajppeal of a judgment or order of the justice court is as provided in Utah Code
Section 78-5-120/' Utah R. Crim. P. 38.
6

Moreover, it would be an unworkable rule to require a party to raise an issue in
the justice court in order to appeal a district court's de novo decision. Justice courts are
not courts of record. Hinson, 966 P.2d at 275; Utah Code of Judicial Admin. 1-101(1)(J).
Absent a judicial record, it would be virtually impossible for a party to conclusively
establish whether or not they had raised a particular issue in the justice court, thereby
possibly denying them their lawful right to appeal.
4

2.

Contrary to the City^s argument Mr, Orvis's claim for selective enforcement

is unquestionably an "as applied" challenge to the constitutionality of the Ordinance. In
simple terms, Mr. Orvis claims the City's application of the Ordinance violated his equal
protection rights because the City selectively enforced the Ordinance against him in a
discriminatory manner. A review of even the most basic authorities confirms that an "as
applied" challenge is "[a] lawsuit claiming that a law or governmental policy, though
constitutional on its face, is unconstitutional as applied, [usually] because of a
discriminatory effect." Black's Law Dictionary 180 (7th ed. 2000); see also Ocean Park
Assoc/s v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 114 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1062 (2004) (noting
an "as applied" challenge seeks "relief from a specific application of a facially valid
statute or ordinance to an individual... as a result of the manner or circumstances in
which the statute or ordinance has been applied." (internal quotations omitted)). This is
exactly what Mr. Orvis has claimed. [12/29/05 Order.]
The City's attempt to distinguish Terkelson from the current case is unconvincing.
The defendants in Terkelson appealed their conviction, arguing "their due process rights
were violated when the City altered its interpretation and enforcement of the ordinance
without notice." 2002 UT App 405,fflj3-4, 7, 61 P.3d 282 (emphasis added). In
response, this Court specifically held the defendants' claim was an "as applied" challenge
to the constitutionality of the ordinance and was therefore sufficient to vest this Court

5

with jurisdiction.7 Id.
Just like Terkelson. Mr. Orvis has presented this Court with an "as applied"
challenge to an ordinance. Like Terkelson. Mr. Orvis is challenging the City's
enforcement of an ordinance. Although Mr. Orvis"s claim involves the constitutional
right to equal protection instead of due process, both claims are premised upon a City's
unlawful enforcement of an ordinance. Try as the City might to distance itself from
Terkelson, the claims in these two cases are parallel.
Finally, the City' reliance on Saniour v. E.P.A.. 56 F.3d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1995), for
the proposition that Mr. Orvis"s claim is not an "as applied" challenge, is wholly
misplaced. The Sanjour court did not determine or even address whether selective
enforcement claims are "as applied" challenges to the validity of an ordinance. Instead,
the Sanjour court simply rejected the notion that a plaintiff can proceed on an "as
applied" First Amendment claim8 vis-a-vis a selective enforcement claim.9 Id at 91-92.
7

The City's attempt to distinguish Terkelson because "the defendants in Terkelson
claimed that the ordinance was void for vagueness or for over-breath," [Appellee Br. at
14], is without merit. The Terkelson court never addressed that claim, and only
referenced it in passing. Terkelson, 2002 UT App 405, *f 5 n.4. The Terkelson court
decided the case based solely on "Defendants' due process argument." kL
8

As the Sanjour court notes, the term "'as applied' [is] a term of art in First
Amendment law," and the analysis of whether a claimant has sufficiently demonstrated an
enforcing officiafs desire to prevent free speech for purposes of a selective enforcement
claim is not the same analysis of whether a claimant has sufficiently demonstrated a First
Amendment "as applied" challenge. Id at 92 n.9.
9

In Sanjour. the plaintiffs challenged an ethics regulation prohibiting employees of
the EPA from being reimbursed for unauthorized speaking engagements. LI at 89. The
6

II.

THE CITY ESSENTIALLY CONCEDES THAT THIS COURT SHOULD
APPLY A LESS DEFERENTIAL STANDARD WHEN REVIEWING THE
FINDINGS OF FACT IN THIS CASE.
Mr. Orvis conclusively established that the district court's findings are clearly

erroneous in several material respects. [Opening Br. at 30-34, 39-44.] Consequently, this
Court should reverse Mr. Orvis's conviction even assuming, arguendo, that the "clearly
erroneous" standard of review applies.
Nonetheless, it is appropriate for this Court to apply a less deferential standard of
review, rather than the clearly erroneous standard, for two separate and independant
reasons. First, the district court mechanically adopted the City's partisan findings
verbatim. [Opening Br. at 44-47.] Second, the findings fail to disclose the steps by
which the district court reached its decision. [Id. at 47-48.] Accordingly, the Court
should perform a more critical review of the factual findings (taking into account the
district court's lack of personal attention to the findings), and should only require Mr.
Orvis to demonstrate that a finding is against the weight of the evidence. [IdL at 48.]
The City wholly failed to address Mr. Orvis's primary standard of review
argument - that the Court should apply a less deferential standard, rather than a clearly

plaintiffs challenged the rule, inter alia, on First Amendment and selective
enforcement/Equal Protection grounds. Id. On summary judgment, the district court
dismissed all of the plaintiffs' First Amendment claims, but did not dismiss the plaintiffs'
selective enforcement claim. Id at 89-90. On appeal, an issue arose as to whether
plaintiffs' entire First Amendment challenge was dismissed, or whether the selective
enforcement claim created a separate "as applied" First Amendment challenge that
remained before the district court. Id. at 91-92.
7

erroneous standard, because the district court mechanically adopted the City's partisan
findings verbatim. [Compare Opening Br. at 44-47 with Appellee Br. at 32-36.] The
City's silence on this issue essentially concedes the clearly erroneous standard should not
apply and underscores that there is not a scintilla of evidence in the record on which to
oppose Mr. Orvis's argument.
Indeed, the uncontroverted record in this cases demonstrates that the district court
mechanically adopted the City's partisan findings verbatim. The district court gave no
reasoning for its ruling, gave no guidance relative to the City's preparation of the
findings, and signed the City's findings without first hearing Mr. Orvis's objections or
reviewing his written objections. [R. 501, pgs. 346-48, 350; R. 389; R. 396-415.] The
district court simply adopted the City's partisan findings verbatim, many of which are
legally insufficient, contrary to the record and, at times, plainly contradicted by the City's
own admissions. [R. 128; R. 374-76; R. 388-95; Opening Br. at 27-34.]
When a district court merely rubberstamps wholesale the partisan findings
proffered by a litigant, the findings are less likely to reflect an impartial deliberative
process and thereby do not warrant the heightened deference of the clearly erroneous
standard. [Opening Br. at 45-46.] Because the district court here afforded the findings it
signed no personal attention whatsoever, this Court should apply a less deferential
standard of review.
The findings, moreover, do not disclose the steps by which the district court

8

reached its decision. The law in Utah is clear that this Court only grants substantial
deference to a district court's findings of fact when the findings "disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." State v. Genovest 871
P.2d 547, 549 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (internal quotations omitted).10 The purpose of this
rule is to allow an appellate court to effectively and meaningfully review the evidentiary
basis for the trial court's decision. 14 at 550; Woodward v. Fazzio, 832 P.2d 474, 477-79
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).
The City wrongly asserts that the findings do disclose the steps by which the
district court reached its decision. The City essentially argues the district court disclosed
how it reached its decision by way of the introductory statement to the findings of fact,
which provides:
The above entitled matter came before the court on Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss and Defendant's Motion to Suppress.... The Court, having heard
the testimony of witnesses, having heard and considered the arguments of
counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, now makes the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law[.]
[Appellee Br. at 32 (quoting R. 395).] The City's reliance on this standard introductory
recitation misses the mark because it only describes fue procedural steps taken by the
district court, not the district court's analytical steps.
The Genovesi case in fact demonstrates that a district court's mere recitation of its

1Q

Genovesi is overruled on other grounds by State v. Bisnen 2001 UT 79, ^ 47, 27
P.3d 1073.
9

procedural steps, as in this case, does not satisfy the requirement that the analytical steps
be disclosed. 871 P.2d at 550 (holding district court's findings insufficient, despite
district court's statement in its findings that the court heard testimony and considered the
arguments of counsel). The standard introductory recitation here does not disclose the
district court's analytical steps, based on the evidence, through which the district court
reached its decision on each factual issue, and, therefore, the findings are not sufficient to
withstand challenge to the district court's legal conclusions.
The district court failed to make specific subsidiary factual findings bearing on the
issue of whether the City selectively enforced the Ordinance against Mr. Orvis. [Opening
Br. at 47-48.] Those subsidiary findings were necessary to disclose the steps by which
the district court decided to deny Mr. Orvis's motion to dismiss. The City's argument that such findings would have been irrelevant because the district court, by implication,
found no disparate treatment of Mr. Orvis - is without merit. If, by way of implication, a
district court's ultimate decision rendered subsidiary factual findings irrelevant, there
would be no need for factual findings at all. This, of course, is not the case.11

u

It is not clear why the City makes a point of devoting over two pages to the
findings which the City claims are admitted. Even assuming arguendo all the findings are
admitted, which they are not, they still would not support the district court's ultimate
conclusion because they fail to set forth the subsidiary facts necessary to support its
decision. Nevertheless, to the extent the City claims findings 2, 5, and 6 are admitted,
such a claim is simply not true. [Opening Br. at 29-33, 34 n.19, 39-41.] Likewise,
findings 7-16 are not admitted by Mr. Orvis; rather, they are admitted by Officer Taufer,
an agent of the City.
10

IIL

THIS CASE SQUARELY PRESENTS A CLAIM FOR SELECTIVE
ENFORCEMENT, SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT IS A DEFENSE TO
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION, AND THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED
THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD.
Contrary to the City's mantra, this case involves selective enforcement, not

selective prosecution. The wrongful conduct at issue is the City officials' decision to
enforce (and the manner in which they enforced) the Ordinance against Mr. Orvis. It is
not the prosecutor's exercise of his discretion to criminally prosecute Mr. Orvis. The City
officials' unconstitutional selective enforcement of the Ordinance against Mr. Orvis
occurred well before this case ever came across the prosecutor's desk.
While subtle, the distinction between selective enforcement and prosecution is
important:
Although courts sometimes use the terms selective prosecution and
selective enforcement interchangeably, they are fundamentally different.
Selective prosecution is a challenge to the prosecutor's decision whether
and how to charge the defendant. Selective enforcement is a challenge to
the actions of other state officers in determining against whom to enforce
the laws.
United States v. Garcia, No. CRIM. A. 99-64-1 MMS., 2000 WL 654377, *12 n.9 (D.
Del. Feb. 28, 2000) (a copy of this opinion is attached as Exhibit B). By definition, Mr.
Orvis's defense is for selective enforcement, not selective prosecution, because he
challenges the decision and actions of the City officials, not the exercise of discretion by
the prosecutor. United States v. Duque-Nava, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1151 (D. Kan.
2004).

11

The City misses the substantive distinction between a defense of selective
enforcement and a defense of selective prosecution. In general, to demonstrate the
challenged conduct is unconstitutional under ordinary equal protection standards, the
defendant must prove the conduct (1) had a discriminatory effect, and (2) was motivated
by a discriminatory purpose. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996). To
determine whether there was a discriminatory purpose, the law differs depending on
whether the claim is for selective enforcement or prosecution.
To prove discriminatory purpose for a selective enforcement claim, the defendant
must demonstrate only that the city officials' decision to enforce the law was either (a)
irrational and wholly arbitrary, or (b) based on animosity or ill-will toward the
individual.12 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech. 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Boone v.
Spurgess, 385 F.3d 923, 932 (6th Cir. 2004). In stark contrast, to prove discriminatory
purpose for a selective prosecution claim, the defendant must demonstrate the
prosecutor's decision to prosecute was "based on 'an unjustifiable standard such as race,

12

The City is wrong in its assertion that Mr. Orvis 'does not provide any
substantive analysis of his claim under the Utah Constitution, nor urge a different result
under the Utah Constitution." [Appellee Br. at 21.] Mr. Orvis expressly cited and
applied Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution to the facts of this case. [Opening
Br. at 24, 25 n.16, 26 n.17, 35-36 n.20, 43 n.22.] Mr. Orvis primarily addressed Federal
law in the text of his opening brief simply for purposes of clarity and continuity, and
because there is a dearth of Utah law which addresses the issue before the Court.
Nevertheless, Mr. Orvis did expressly assert that, even if the Court applied the Federal
standards relied on by the City, the Court should reach a different result under Utah's
uniform operation of laws provision. [IdL at 35-36 n.20, 43 n.22.]
12

religion, or other arbitrary classification.'" Armstrong. 517 U.S. at 464 (citation
omitted).13
In this case, Mr. Orvis's defense is for selective enforcement, not selective
prosecution. Consequently, the City's argument that selective prosecution has not been
established is irrelevant, the authorities on which the City relies are inapposite, and,
notwithstanding the requirements of selective prosecution, Mr. Orvis''s prima facie
showing of selective enforcement in the district court warrants reversal. Mr. Orvis was
required to prove only that the selective treatment was irrational and wholly arbitrary or
based on animosity or ill-will toward the individual. He was not, contrary to the City's
position, required to prove he was treated differently based on race, religion, etc.
The City is also wrong that selective enforcement is not a defense to a criminal
prosecution and is limited to civil actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That argument is
pure jawbone and is not supported by citation to even a single authority. On the other
hand, well-reasoned authority has squarely held that selective enforcement is a defense to
a criminal prosecution. For example, in Jones v. Sterling. 110 P.3d 1271 (Ariz. 2005), the
central issue on appeal was "whether petitioners' selective enforcement claims could

13

To prove the challenged conduct had a discriminatory effect, the test is
essentially the same for both selective enforcement and prosecution: for selective
enforcement, the defendant must demonstrate that similarly-situated individuals could
have been, but were not, arrested or referred for prosecution; for selective prosecution,
the defendant must show that similarly situated individuals could have been, but were not,
prosecuted. Duque-Nava. 315 F. Supp. 2d at 1152 n.15.
13

constitute a 'defense' to the pending criminal charges." Id at 1273. The State contended
"that proof of selective enforcement... is not a defense to a criminal charge, but rather
entitles injured parties only to civil redress pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at 1274.
The Arizona Supreme Court soundly rejected that argument:
[T]he fact that a § 1983 claim is an available remedy for selective
enforcement does not make it the exclusive remedy. No case cited by the
State so holds, and we are aware of none.... [A] long line of precedent
establishes that proof of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment through
selective enforcement or selective prosecution can be offered by a
defendant in defense of criminal charges.
Although the selective enforcement claim in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356 (1886)] was somewhat different than the one here, the case squarely
stands for the proposition that violation of the Equal Protection Clause by
authorities enforcing a facially neutral law can result in dismissal of
resulting criminal charges.
The State is thus incorrect in asserting that a § 1983 claim is the sole
remedy for selective enforcement.
14 at 1274-76.
Indeed, several courts have recognized that selective enforcement of a criminal law
is a defense to a criminal prosecution, even when based on a rational basis analysis, and,
when proven, requires dismissal of the criminal information. See e.g.. People v. Eng'rs
Country Club, Inc.. No. 01-03, 2003 WL 21537412, at **4-5 (N.Y. Just. Ct. June 23,
2003) (recognizing "class of one" selective enforcement as defense to criminal
prosecution, recognizing that such defense may be predicated on a showing that there was
no rational basis for the discriminatory treatment, but finding a rational basis for
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application of the ordinance at issue to the defendant) (a copy of this opinion is attached
as Exhibit C); Cyprus v. Diskin, 936 F. Supp. 259, 263-64 (E.D. Penn. 1996) (noting that
claims of selective enforcement "are most often raised as defenses to a criminal
prosecution" and stating the claimant can succeed in such cases by demonstrating the
state official "had no rational basis whatsoever for" the selective enforcement).
In sum, the City's attempt to pigeon hole Mr. Orvis's defense as selective
prosecution is incorrect. The relevant case law squarely supports a defense of selective
enforcement, the standards for demonstrating selective enforcement are different from
those which are used for selective prosecution, and the facts of this case establish the City
selectively enforced the Ordinance against Mr. Orvis in denial of his constitutional right
to equal protection of the law.
IV.

THE CITY SELECTIVELY ENFORCED ITS ORDINANCE AGAINST MR,
ORVIS IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL EQUAL
PROTECTION RIGHTS.
A*

The City Intentionally Treated Mr. Orvis Differently than Others Who
Were Similarly Situated.

As demonstrated in Mr. Orvis's opening brief, the City intentionally treated Mr.
Orvis differently than the 35 people with whom he was similarly situated. [Opening Br.
at 26-34.] The City's arguments to the contrary accentuate the merit of Mr. Orvis's
position.
1.

The City's first argument - that others similarly situated were prosecuted -

is not accurate and misrepresents the record. Citing to R. 322-44, the City asserts that
15

"[bjetween 1999 and 2003, the City . . . initiated at least twenty-four criminal
prosecutions against individuals for operating businesses within the city without a
license."14 [Appellee Br. at 7; see id at 24-25.] R. 322-44 is Exhibit E to the City's
supplemental memorandum on the "selective enforcement issue." [R. 345; R. 379.]
Exhibit E contains 23 enforcement actions, 18 criminal citations and 5 criminal
informations, all ranging in date from May 11, 2002 to February 25, 2004. [R. 322-44.]
As demonstrated by Exhibit E, the City did not issue a criminal citation for
operating a business without a licence, except to Mr. Orvis, until May 2002. [Id.] This
was approximately 6 months after Mr. Orvis's November 21, 2001 criminal citation, [R.
5], and only after Mr. Orvis asserted the City was not "treat[ing him] fairly like everybody
else."15 [R. 79.] For the City to state it began criminally citing people under the
Ordinance in 1999 is a flagrant misrepresentation of the record.
Moreover, not one of the 23 people who received criminal citations after May
2002 were among the 35 people with whom Mr. Orvis was similarly situated; in fact, not
14

The City also misquotes Mr. Orvis*s brief when it claims Mr. Orvis has made a
fatal admission to the above assertion. The full quote, which is partially quoted by the
City on page 24 of its brief, states: "Apparently, as a result of the selective
enforcement allegations raised by Mr. Orvis in this case and his civil case, the City
began actively citing and prosecuting individuals for doing business without a license in
or about May 2002. None of the people who were subsequently cited and prosecuted
were on the list of 300." [Opening Br. at 15 n.14.] The bolded portions show those
portions which the City conveniently left out of its quote.
15

Further, the City did not cite a Pleasant Grove resident for operating a business
without a license until December 27, 2002, more than one year after the City cited Mr.
Orvis. [R. 322-44.]
16

one of the 23 were even on the list of 300.16 [R. 500, pgs. 67, 73; R. 292-309; R. 322-44.]
Thus, the City's subsequent criminal citations are wholly irrelevant to the issue before the
Court.17 This is not a situation where Mr. Orvis was the first of many to be prosecuted,
[Appellee Br. at 24 n.8]; rather, it is a situation where Mr. Orvis was the only person to be
prosecuted when compared with those who were similarly situated.
2.

The City's second argument - that Mr. Orvis is not similarly situated to any

group of people - is contrary to the law and the record. The City argues that "the facts
which were analyzed . . . by the City enforcing officials, presented a situation dissimilar
to anyone else." [Appellee Br. at 25.] The City bases this argument on the following
"facts:" (1) Mr. Orvis allegedly "submitted a falsified and/or incorrect business licence
application;"18 (2) "Mr. Orvis declined to allow the City to inspect his business;" and,
arguably, (3) Mr. Orvis's violation of the Ordinance had allegedly "been longstanding
16

Only five of the 24 were even residents of Pleasant Grove. [R. 330-33, 338.]
The rest of the 24 were either residents of other cities in Utah, such as Alpine [R. 325],
Draper [R. 324], Murray [R. 323, 326], Orem [R. 340, 344], Sandy [R. 336], South Jordan
[R. 327], Taylorsville [R. 329, 335], Tooele [R. 328], West Jordan [R. 322], and West
Valley [R. 334], or residents of other states, such as Florida [R. 342], Kansas, [R. 341],
Missouri [R. 339], Tennessee [R. 343], and Texas [R. 337]. This further demonstrates
that the 23 are not similarly situated to Mr. Orvis.
1

furthermore, the record indicates the 23 were cited for door-to-door sales rather
than for actually operating a business without a license. [See R. 500, p. 68; R. 344
(citation for "selling without license) (emphasis added); R. 326 (same); R. 325 (same).]
18

Mr. Orvis has never admitted he misrepresented his business on his application to
the City. To the contrary, Mr. Orvis testified, and the record demonstrates, that Mr. Orvis
did not know whether Design Fabricators was a major or minor home occupation at the
time he filed his application. [R. 354-58; R. 500, pgs. 87-89, 112-13.]
17

and flagrant." [14 at 25-26, 29.]
By relying on these facts, the City assumes, without legal citation, that the law
requires absolute identity, rather than similarity, of situations. What's more, the City
assumes, without record citation, that the City actually considered these purportedly
distinguishing facts when it made its enforcement decision. Based on the applicable law
and the record in this case, both assumptions are wrong.
First, the law does not require absolute identity of factual circumstances; rather, it
only requires the defendant to demonstrate he was treated differently than those similarly
situated. Fedorov v. United States. 600 A.2d 370, 379-81 (D.C. 1991); see also
Barrington Cove Ltd. P^ship v. Rhode Island Housing Corp.. 246 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001)
("Exact correlation is neither likely nor necessary."). Similarity, moreover, only requires
the factual circumstances to be similar in relevant aspects. Barrington Cove, 246 F.3d at
8.
The Fedorov case illustrates that a rule such as the one proposed by the City is
underinclusive and contrary to the law. In Fedorov, the defendants were arrested and
prosecuted for unlawful entry for refusing to leave a subway station during a political
demonstration. Each defendant, as a first-time offender, was eligible for, but was denied,
admission to the United States Attorney's pretrial diversion program. The defendants
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filed motions to dismiss based on selective prosecution,19 arguing they were denied
admission because of their status as political demonstrators. The trial courts denied the
defendants' motions. Federov, 600 A.2d at 372-73.
On appeal, the court was squarely confronted with the issue of the proper control
group for purposes of the similarly situated test. Below, the government argued, and both
trial judges agreed, "that the appropriate comparison group for selective prosecution
analysis was all persons who had participated the same night in the demonstration on
behalf of the homeless at the same place." WL at 380. The appellate court flatly rejected
that conclusion, holding that such a classification was "fatally underinclusive." IcL In so
holding, the appellate court explained that the government's analysis, "in effect,
eliminated all room for comparison by considering as the control group only those
persons whose constitutionally significant behavior was the same as that of appellants."
Id. Concluding that the government's analysis "would inevitably defeat any meaningful
comparison for selective prosecution purposes," the appellate court held "that prima
facie, i.e., presumptively, all persons charged with violating a particular statute (who are
first-time offenders without other pending charges) are 'similarly situated' for selective
prosecution/diversion analysis."20 IdL
19

Although Fedorov involves selective prosecution, the principles underlying the
"similarly situated" test apply with equal force to selective enforcement. See supra, note
13.
20

Although the Federov court stated it was "not prepared to hold that this must be
the appropriate comparison group in all cases," the court emphasized that for "'similarly
19

The City, like the government in Fedorov. is attempting to eliminate all room for
meaningful comparison. Contrary to the City's assertion, the relevant control group was
not required to have submitted a falsified and/or incorrect business license application,
declined an inspection, or had "longstanding and flagrant" violations of the Ordinance. It
is undisputed that Mr. Orvis was not criminally cited or prosecuted based on any of those
alleged facts. Those facts, therefore, are not relevant aspects of the crime for which Mr.
Orvis was cited and prosecuted.21
Mr. Orvis was criminally cited and prosecuted for violating the Ordinance. All
individuals who were similarly violating the Ordinance as of the City's August 3, 2001
deadline constitute the relevant control group. Fedorov, 600 A.2d at 379 (agreeing that
"the unlawful conduct defined by the elements of the crime itself comprises the defining
criterion"). That group, as demonstrated by the record, is comprised of the 35 people,
including Mr. Orvis, who were on the Tax list, were on the list of 300, did not file an
application by the City's deadline, and continued to do business without a license.

situated' analysis, the only possible basis for subgrouping violators of a particular
criminal statute or provision is some kind of legally definable line." I d at 380-81 & n.16.
21

The City's reliance on Geaneas v. Willets. 715 F. Supp. 334, 340 (M. D. Fla.
1989), for the proposition that a "longstanding and flagrant" violation of an ordinance is a
relevant consideration in demonstrating the dissimilarity of situations, is entirely
misplaced. The Geaneas court did not even address that factor in the context of whether
the plaintiffs were treated differently than those similarly situated. In fact, the court
found the plaintiffs "set forth evidence sufficient to meet the first prong of the selective
enforcement test," Le., that the plaintiffs were treated differently than those similarly
situated. Id.
20

Because Mr. Orvis was the only one out of the 35 who was criminally cited and
prosecuted, Mr. Orvis was treated differently than those similarly situated.
Second, the City's argument that it actually relied on facts which allegedly
differentiated Mr. Orvis from anyone else is contrary to the record. There is not a single
piece of evidence in the record - none - that gives rise to an inference the City considered
these purportedly differentiating facts when the City decided to enforce the Ordinance
against Mr. Orvis. Instead, the only evidence in the record relative to what facts the City
considered for its enforcement decision demonstrates the City only considered its
animosity toward Mr. Orvis for the political stance he took on city-wide development
while sitting on the Planning Commission. [R. 76-77; R. 80; R. 277; R. 311-12; R. 500,
pg. 91.] This, of course, is not a proper consideration in determining against whom to
enforce an ordinance. Mimics, Inc. v. Vill. of Angel Fire. 394 F.3d 836, 849 (10th Cir.
2005); Esmail v. Macrane. 53 F.3d 176, 179-80 (7th Cir. 1995).
B.

The City's Selective Treatment of Mr. Orvis was Irrational and Wholly
Arbitrary and was Based on the City's Animosity Toward Mr. Orvis.

As demonstrated in Mr. Orvis's opening brief, the City's selective enforcement
was irrational and wholly arbitrary and based on the City's animosity and ill-will toward
Mr. Orvis. [Opening Br. at 34-44.] Indeed, there was no legitimate rational basis for
treating Mr. Orvis differently than those with whom he was similarly situated. Moreover,
the record demonstrates the City's selective treatment was motivated by City officials'
animosity and political spite toward Mr. Orvis. [R. 76-77; R. 80; R. 277; R. 311-12; R.
21

500,pg.9L]
The City wholly fails to address either of these bases for Mr. Orvis's defense of
selective enforcement. Rather, relying on selective prosecution standards, the City simply
hangs its hat on the argument that Mr. Orvis was required but failed to prove the City's
selective treatment of Mr. Orvis was based on race, religion or the desire to prevent
exercise of constitutional rights. The City does not rebut the City's lack of a rational
basis or its animosity and its political spite toward Mr. Orvis. As a result, the only
conclusion this Court can reach, based on the record, is that the City's selective treatment
was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
Try as the City might to distance itself from the standards applicable to the defense
of selective enforcement, the fact remains, as the United States Supreme Court has held,
that an individual's constitutional equal protection rights are violated if a city's selective
treatment was either (a) irrational and wholly arbitrary, or (b) based on animosity or illwill toward the individual. Olech, 528 U.S. at 564; see also Boone, 385 F.3d at 932
(holding that, after Olech, selective enforcement may be based on either a bad faith
motive or arbitrariness). Courts applying the second-prong of that test have held that
evidence demonstrating the selective treatment was motivated by local officials'
animosity or political spite toward the individual is sufficient. Mimics, 394 F.3d at 849;
Esmail 53 F.3d at 179-80. It matters not that these cases arose in a civil context under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Jones, 110 P.3d at 1274-76. The standards remain the same for both civil
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plaintiffs and criminal defendants. See e ^ , Cyprus, 936 F. Supp. at 263-64 (applying
same rational basis standard set forth in Olech); Engineers Country Club, 2003 WL
21537412 at *4 (same).
Mr. Orvis has established a prima facie case of selective enforcement based on
both the irrationality of the City's selective treatment and the fact the City's treatment was
motivated by animosity and political spite toward Mr. Orvis. The City has entirely failed
to rebut Mr. Orvis's prima facie case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons in Mr. Orvis's opening and reply briefs, this Court should reverse
the district court's denial of Mr. Orvis's motion to dismiss, reverse Mr. Orvis's conviction
and dismiss this case.

DATED:

April J , 2006.
TOMSIC & PECK
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be mailed this J/^ day of April, 2006 to the
following:
Peter Stirba
Meb W. Anderson
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES
215 South State Street, Suite 750
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Bret B. Hicken
Pleasant Grove City Attorney's Office
70 South 100 East
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062
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Pleasant Grove City,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No. 20050343-CA
v.
Victor R." Orvis,
Defendant and Appellant,

Before Judges Davis, McHugh, and Orme.
This matter is before the court on Pleasant Grove City's
motion for summary disposition. Pleasant Grove City alleges that
this court does not have jurisdiction over the appeal because the
case originated in justice court and was then appealed to the
district court. However, Utah Code section 78-5-120(7} states
that the decision of a district court may be appealed when "the
district court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or
ordinance." Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 (2002); see also State v.
Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 276-77 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Orvis's
docketing statement indicates that he is appealing the
constitutionality of an ordinance as applied to him. Thus, this
court has jurisdiction to resolve that issue only. See id. at
277.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Pleasant Grove City's motion for
summary disposition is denied.
IT IS ALSO HEREBY ORDERED that Orvis's request for costs and
attorney's fees is denied.
DATED this
FOR THE COURT:

2!"day of

December, 2005

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on December 29, 2 005, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail to the parties listed below:
STEPHEN H SCHREINER
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SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
BRET B HICKEN
PLEASANT GROVE CITY PROSECUTOR
70 S 100 E
PLEASANT GROVE UT 84062
Dated this December 29, 2005.
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United States District Court, D. Delaware.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff,
v.
Segundo GARCIA, Defendant.
No. CRIM. A. 99-64-1 MMS.
Feb. 28, 2000.
Keith M. Rosen, Assistant United States Attorney,
Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for
plaintiff.
Christopher S. Kovste. Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
SCHWARTZ. Senior J.
I. Introduction
*1 On September 14, 1999, the Grand Jury for the
District of Delaware returned a two-count indictment
against the defendant, Segundo Garcia ("Garcia").
Count One charges Garcia with the knowing and
intentional possession with intent to distribute five or
more kilograms of a mixture containing cocaine, in
violation of21U.S.C.$S 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B).
Count Two charges Garcia with conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. SS 841(a)(1). 841(b)(1)(B). and 846. Docket
Item ("D.I.") 11. Garcia pled not guilty to both counts
and filed this motion pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3) to suppress physical
evidence seized from his vehicle and statements made
following his arrest. Garcia has also requested that the
Court allow him to take additional discovery to support
his motion.
For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny
Garcia's request to take additional discovery. The Court

will enter an order suppressing Garcia's statements
concerning his country of origin and that he did not
have any immigration paperwork or an alien card. The
Court will deny his motion to suppress as to all other
evidence.
II. Findings of Fact
At the evidentiary hearing, the Government called
Delaware State Police Lieutenant Albert Homiak and
Delaware State Police Sergeant Patrick Ogden. The
defendant called Delaware State Police Corporal David
Szafranski. The defendant did not testify. The court
makes the following essential findings of fact as
required by Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
At about 6:15 p.m. on August 25,1999, Lt. Homiak, an
eighteen year veteran of the Delaware State Police, and
Cpl. Szafranski were on patrol in a police cruiser on
southbound U.S. Interstate 95 in New Castle County,
Delaware. As Lt. Homiak drove the cruiser and
approached the toll plaza near the Maryland state line,
the officers observed a green Dodge Intrepid stopped
on the roadway near the entrance of one of the toll
booths labeled "E-Z Pass Only." They then observed
the Intrepid begin to back up even though other vehicles
were approaching from behind. The Intrepid then
stopped and quickly changed one lane to the left
without signaling. At that time, the officers were
sufficiently far away that they were unable determine
the state in which the car was licensed.
The officers concluded that the movements of the
Intrepid were unsafe and could have contributed to an
accident. They also concluded that the driver had
violated Delaware state traffic laws prohibiting
inattentive driving and changing lanes without a signal.
Lt. Homiak followed the Intrepid from behind as it
entered the toll plaza. While the Intrepid was in the
plaza, Lt. Homiak drove the police cruiser to another
toll lane to the left of the one being used by the
Intrepid. Neither officer was able to see the Intrepid or
its occupants while it was in the toll plaza. The Intrepid
pulled out first and then Lt. Homiak followed the
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Intrepid from behind and activated the patrol car
emergency equipment. The Intrepid pulled over onto
the right shoulder. At this point, the officers observed
that the car contained two occupants but had not seen
them from the front or side, and therefore, could not
determine the gender, race, or any other physical
characteristics of the occupants.
*2 Lt. Homiak approached the car from the driver's
side while Cpl. Szafranski approached from the
passenger's side. They observed a driver, later identified
as defendant Segundo Garcia, and one passenger, later
identified as Abel Noya ("Noya"). Lt. Homiak asked
Garcia for his license and registration. Garcia produced
his license from his pants pocket and a car rental
agreementfromthe glove box. When Garcia handed the
documents to Lt. Homiak, his hand was shaking.
Lt. Homiak then asked Garcia to exit the car and
proceed to the rear of the car between the Intrepid and
the police cruiser. Lt. Homiak testified that he made this
request because his standing between the Intrepid and
the interstate traffic created a personal safety concern
and because it would be easier to converse away from
the road noise. Lt. Homiak testified that it is habit to ask
all drivers to exit their cars during a traffic stop. Cpl.
Szafranski testified that, on that day and on prior
occasions he worked with Lt. Homiak, Lt. Homiak
asked about 30% of all drivers to exit their cars. He also
testified that the primary reasons for asking a driver out
of the car are concerns for officer safety and road noise.
Garcia complied with Lt. Homiak's request. Once
Garcia was outside the car, Lt. Homiak informed him
that he had been stopped because of the
above-mentioned traffic violations. Garcia responded
that he was not paying attention when he approached
the toll because he was looking down to count money
and ended up in the "E-Z Pass Only" lane. Garcia
agreed that he backed up and changed lanes without
signaling. Lt. Homiak noted that Garcia spoke with an
accent, but could understand English and answered all
questions spontaneously. Lt. Homiak concluded that
there was no language barrier. During this conversation,
Lt. Homiak noticed that Garcia seemed nervous and
repeatedly glanced back over his shoulder towards the
Intrepid and looked down at the ground.

Page 2

Lt. Homiak examined the rental agreement and noticed
that the car had been rented to Robert Carter in Key
West, Florida four days earlier. He also noticed that
Garcia was listed as a secondary driver on the car. Lt.
Homiak then asked who had rented the car. Garcia
responded that it was a "friend." Lt. Homiak asked if
the "friend" was the passenger. Garcia said "no." Lt.
Homiak then asked for the name of the person who had
rented the car. Lt. Homiak observed a nervous and
frightened look on Garcia's face and he appeared more
nervous than he had originally appeared. Garcia asked
him to repeat the question and Lt. Homiak did. Garcia
responded that afriendhad rented the car but he did not
know the friend's name. Garcia also stated that the
renter lived in Key West but he did not know the
address.
At this point, Lt. Homiak asked Garciafromwhere he
was traveling. Garcia responded that they were coming
from Boston, where they had gone to visit Garcia's
ex-wife. He stated that they had stayed there for one
day. Lt. Homiak noticed Garcia licking his lips and
observed that he appeared increasingly more nervous.
Lt. Homiak believed he was more nervous than the
average person in a traffic stop. Lt. Homiak then asked
his destination and he stated that they were headed back
to Florida. Lt. Homiak also asked him the name of his
passenger. Garcia stated that he was a friend from
Florida but that he only knew him as "Slim."
*3 Lt. Homiak then asked him what country he was
from. Garcia stated he wasfromCuba and that he was
not a U.S. citizen. Lt. Homiak asked if he had any
paperwork or an alien card and Garcia stated that he did
not.
Next, Lt. Homiak approached the passenger, who was
still seated in the car. The passenger identified himself
as Abel Noya. Lt. Homiak asked if he had any
identification and he said he did not. Lt. Homiak then
asked from where he was traveling. Noya replied
"Baltimore." Lt. Homiak explained that they were
actually headed toward Baltimore. Noya repeated that
they were coming from Baltimore. He then said he
meant Boston. Noya then correctly identified the
defendant as Garcia. Noya stated that he and Garcia had
stayed in Boston for three days and had gone to see a
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friend of Garcia's. Lt. Homiak asked Noya who had
rented the car and Noya responded that he did not
know. Noya told Lt. Homiak that he was from Cuba,
was not a U.S. citizen, and did not have any paperwork
or an alien card.
At this point Lt. Homiak was suspicious that criminal
activity may be afoot. Based upon his suspicion, Lt.
Homiak asked Garcia to sit in the back of the police car
and Garcia complied. Garcia was not restrained at this
point but he could not open the doors from the inside.
Lt. Homiak sat in the front seat of the police cruiser and
asked Garcia if he would consent to a search of the
Intrepid. Garcia said he would allow the search. Garcia
appeared to be coherent and to not have any trouble
understanding Lt. Homiak.
Lt. Homiak then asked Garcia if he could read English
or Spanish better. Garcia stated he could read both but
that he was better at Spanish. Lt. Homiak handed
Garcia his license and rental agreement. Next, Lt.
Homiak gave Garcia a standard Delaware State Police
consent-to-search form, written in Spanish. Lt. Homiak
told Garcia that the form was a consent to search form
and not a traffic ticket. As he handed over the form, Lt.
Homiak informed Garcia that he had the right to refuse
consent. Garcia looked the form over for about forty
seconds before signing the form. Garcia never indicated
that he had any trouble reading or understanding the
form. Lt. Homiak never made any promises or threats
to induce his consent.
Next, Lt. Homiak asked him what, if anything, in the
car belonged to him. Garcia replied that he had some
clothes and shoes in the trunk, but that the bag in the
trunk belonged to Noya. Lt. Homiak and Cpl.
Szafranski asked Noya to exit the car. Lt. Homiak
informed Noya that Garcia had consented to a search of
the vehicle and asked him if he had any objection. Noya
shook his head from side to side and said no. Lt.
Homiak asked Noya, what, if anything, in the car
belonged to him. Noya replied that he owned a brown
overnight bag in the trunk. Lt. Homiak asked Noya if
they could search the bag. Noya nodded his head and
said "yeah."
Lt. Homiak and Cpl. Szafranski searched the Intrepid.

They noticed an odor of air freshener in the front seat
and found a can of spray air freshener under the seat
where Noya had been seated. The officers found no
contraband in the passenger compartment. They opened
the trunk and discovered loose clothing, a pair of shoes,
and a brown overnight bag. Cpl. Szafranski unzipped
the bag, looked through the contents, and removed a
plastic wrapped package, which appeared to contain a
white powdery substance, that Lt. Homiak believed to
be a narcotic. The package was later field tested by Sgt.
Ogden testing positive for the presence of cocaine.
*4 Lt. Homiak removed Garcia from the police cruiser
and placed him in handcuffs. He told Garcia he was
under arrest and advised Garcia of his Miranda [FN11
rights from a card. Lt. Homiak asked Garcia if he
understood his rights and Garcia stated that he did. Lt.
Homiak then approached Noya. About five minutes
later, Lt. Homiak returned to the police car where
Garcia was seated. Lt. Homiak asked Garcia if he
wanted to talk about what was going on. Garcia
indicated that if he said anything, someone would kill
his family. He also expressed concern for his elderly
father and mentally ill brother. Lt. Homiak asked Garcia
if the drugs in the car were a payment for transporting
a larger load of drugs to Boston. Garcia stated that Lt.
Homiak was close to being correct.
FN1. Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 444
(1966).
Garcia was then transported to Delaware State Police
Troop 9 in Odessa, Delaware. In the Captain's office,
Garcia was interviewed by Lt. Homiak, Sgt. Ogden, and
DEA Special Agent Eric Miller. Garcia was seated in a
chair across the desk from the officers and was not
restrained in any way. Lt. Homiak reminded Garcia of
his Miranda rights, explained those rights were still in
effect, and said that they wished to ask him some
questions. Garcia stated he understood those rights and
that he wanted to cooperate. He was coherent and had
no trouble speaking English. No threats or promises
were made to induce him to talk. He did not appear to
be under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
During the ensuing conversation, Garcia made the
following statements:
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. He was on parole for smuggling 30,000 pounds of
marijuana into the U.S. and that this arrest would
make him a career criminal;
. He was just the driver in this incident;
. He had driven to Boston with his neighbor Slim;
. Slim lived across the street from him in Key West;
. He and Slim transported the cocaine found in the
Intrepid to Boston;
. They were hoping to get a higher price for the drugs
in Boston than they could in Key West;
. They were taking the cocaine back to Florida
because they could not get the higher price.
After Garcia made these statements, all questioning
ceased.
III. Discussion
In his motion to suppress, Garcia raises five distinct
Fourth and Fifth Amendment challenges. First, Garcia
challenges the validity of the stop of his automobile.
Second, Garcia contends that asking him to exit his car
was not constitutionally permissible. Third, Garcia
asserts the roadside questioning of Garcia and the
detention of Garcia in the patrol car violated the Fourth
Amendment. Fourth, Garcia argues that he did not
voluntarily consent to the search of the Dodge Intrepid.
Fifth, Garcia contends that his statements were not
made pursuant to a valid waiver of his Miranda rights.
In addition, Garcia asserts that all of the evidence
should be suppressed because the police violated his
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection and Privileges and Immunities clauses.
Lastly, Garcia requests permission to take additional
discovery, including a subpoena of police records, to
support his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment
challenges.
A. Fourth and Fifth Amendment Challenges
1. Validity of Traffic Stop
*5 Garcia contends the stop of the Dodge Intrepid was
an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The Fourth Amendment permits law
enforcement officials to stop an automobile if the
official has probable cause to believe that the vehicle or
driver has violated a traffic law. See Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806. 810 (1996); United States v.
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Moorfield 111 F.3d 10. 12 (3d Cir.1997). The Court
credits the testimony of Lt. Homiak and Cpl. Szafranski
and finds that the Dodge Intrepid stopped in front of the
toll plaza, drove in reverse against oncoming traffic,
and suddenly changed lanes without signaling. These
events would give an objective officer probable cause
to believe that the Intrepid violated 21 Del.Code§4155
(prohibiting changing lanes without signaling) and 21
Del.Code § 4176 (prohibiting careless or inattentive
driving).
2. Ordering Garcia to Exit Car
Garcia argues that Lt. Homiak's ordering him out of the
car after receiving his driver's license and rental
agreement was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.
In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, the Supreme Court
established a bright line rule that officers may lawfully
order any driver to step out of the vehicle during a
traffic stop. See 434 U.S. 106. 109-11 (1977):
Moorefield, 111 F.3d at 12. The Court established this
rule after concluding that "legitimate and weighty"
concerns for officer safety outweighed the de minimus
intrusion of asking a driver to exit the automobile. See
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110-11. The Court credits Lt.
Homiak s testimony that he asked Garcia out of the car
because he feared for his own safety standing between
the car and oncoming traffic and because of traffic
noise. It follows, ordering Garcia out of the car did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.
3. Roadside Questioning of Garcia and Continued
Detention in Patrol Car
While Garcia was standing on the side of the road next
to the car, Lt. Homiak asked him the following
questions, in order:
1. Who rented the car?
2. Is the renter the passenger of the car?
3. What is the name of the friend that rented the car?
4. Where did you travel from?
5. How long were you there?
6. What was the purpose of your trip?
7. What is your destination?
8. What is the name of the passenger?
9. What country are you from?
10. Do you have any paperwork [FN21 or an alien
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card?
FN2. By paperwork, the Court surmises Lt.
Homiak meant immigration paperwork.
After receiving Garcia's answers, observing Garcia's
demeanor, and obtaining contradictory statements from
Noya, Lt. Homiak moved Garcia from the roadside to
the backseat of the patrol car. While in the patrol car,
Lt. Homiak obtained Garcia's verbal and written
consent to search the automobile. Defendants contend
that these questions and the movement of Garcia violate
the Fourth Amendment because they exceed the scope
of detention and questioning allowed during a traffic
stop. TFN31
FN3. It is not clear from defendant's motion
whether he challenges the admissibility of his
statements made during this time period as
being in violation of his Miranda rights. The
motion seeks suppression of statements that
were obtained because he "did not receive
effective advisement of his Miranda rights
and/or that he did not knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waive those rights as he
understood them." D.I. 28 at f 18. However,
because Garcia has not briefed this argument,
he is deemed to have waived it.
Nonetheless, a suspect's Miranda rights do not
attach unless the suspect is in custody and
subject to interrogation. See United States v.
Leese. 176 F.3d 740. 743 (3d Cir.1999).
During a traffic stop and a Terry stop, a
suspect is not in custody for purposes of
Miranda. See Berkemer 468 U.S. at 440;
United States v. Elias. 832 F.2d 24, 26 (3d
Cir.1987). As discussed in the text, infra, the
Court finds that the initial three questions
occurred during a routine traffic stop. The
Court also finds that all of the subsequent
questions up to and including Lt. Homiak's
request for consent to search constituted a
Terry stop. Accordingly, the defendant was
not entitled to receive Miranda warnings
during this questioning and none of his
statements were obtained in violation of
Miranda.

A police officer may only lawfully detain an individual
for a traffic violation for the period necessary to
completely investigate the traffic violation. See Florida
v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491. 500 (1983) ("an investigative
detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"); United
States v. Johnson. 63 F.3d 242. 247 (3d Cir.1995);
Karnes v. Skrutsla. 62 F.3d 485. 491 (3d Cir.1995)
(civil case). During a traffic stop, the officer must limit
his questioning to matters directly related to the traffic
stop. See Berkemer v. McCartv, 468 U.S. 420. 439
(1984); Karnes. 62 F.3d at 494. If, however, during
questioning related to the routine traffic stop, the officer
identifies articuable facts that create reasonable
suspicion of additional criminal activity, the officer may
continue to detain the driver and investigate the facts
giving rise to the additional suspicion. See Berkemer,
468 U.S. at 439 (citing Tern v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1.29
(1968)); Johnson, 63 F.3d at 247. Whether a reasonable
and articuable suspicion exists turns on an objective
assessment of the totality of the circumstances. See
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1. 8 (1989). The
officer may ask "a moderate number of questions ... to
try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the
officer's suspicions." See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439.
*6 The Government urges the Court to adopt rulings of
the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, which held the scope of
a traffic stop investigation reasonably includes asking
for the license and registration, asking the driver about
car ownership, destination, and purpose of the trip, and
asking the driver to sit in the patrol car. See United
States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160. 1163 (8th Cir.1994);
United States v. Castillo, 76 F.3d 1114. 1117-18 (10th
Cir.1996). Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
has cited Ramos for another proposition, it has not
expressly adopted this bright line rule regarding the
scope of permissible detention and questioning during
a traffic stop. See Johnson, 63 F.3d at 247. On the facts
of this case, the Court finds it unnecessary to adopt this
bright line rule because Lt. Homiak's initial actions
were directly related to the traffic stop and his later
actions were in response to a reasonable suspicion
raised by Garcia's and Noya's responses.
Lt. Homiak's first three questions, regarding the name
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of the primary renter of the car and whether the renter
was the passenger, were directly related to the reason
for the traffic stop. Garcia was stopped, in part, for
inattentive driving. Because the car was rented, it was
reasonable for Lt. Homiak to ascertain whether the
passenger was the primary renter who may be able to
take over driving. The Court also credits Lt. Homiak's
testimony that it is common police practice to ascertain
the identity of the driver and owner of an automobile
during any traffic stop, in order to ensure a car is not
stolen. In short, these three questions related directly to
investigating the traffic stop.
Based on Garcia's answers and demeanor in response
to the first three questions, it was reasonable for Lt.
Homiak to have suspicion that additional criminal
activity, such as an automobile theft or drug transport,
may be afoot. See United States v. Hernandez, 872
F.Supp. 1288,1293 (D.Del. 1994) (reasonable suspicion
of drug smuggling aroused by smell of air freshener,
inability to answer routine questions such as name and
address of company, nervousness, and avoiding eye
contact). Garcia responded to Lt. Homiak's first three
questions by stating that a "friend" had rented the car,
that the passenger was not that friend, and that he did
not know the name of the renter. Garcia also repeated
several of the questions before responding and paused
before answering. When answering Garcia appeared
nervous and frightened, even more so than he initially
appeared. He also repeatedly glanced back over his
shoulder towards the Intrepid and looked down at the
ground. A reasonable police officer could conclude that
these facts together raise a reasonable suspicion of
additional criminal activity, such as automobile theft or
drug smuggling. Given the totality of these
circumstances, Lt. Homiak was entitled to ask a
"moderate number of questions" to attempt to confirm
or deny his reasonable suspicion. See Berkemer, 468
U.S. at 439.
*7 Lt. Homiak's next five questions, regarding the city
from which Garcia was traveling, the length of his trip,
the purpose of the trip, his destination, and the name of
his passenger constituted a moderate number of
questions used to confirm or refute Lt. Homiak's
reasonable suspicion of additional criminal activity.
These questions all relate to confirming or dispelling
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any suspicion that the car was stolen or that Garcia was
involved with drug smuggling. Therefore, these five
questions were within the scope of those permitted by
the Fourth Amendment.
However, Lt. Homiak's subsequent two questions
concerning Garcia's country of origin and whether he
had an alien card were beyond the scope of permissible
questioning. The record reveals no reason for asking
these questions. Although one could dream up possible
reasons, the Court concludes that these questions were
not reasonably designed to confirm or refute any
suspicion of automobile theft or drug smuggling.
Moreover, prior to asking these questions, Lt. Homiak
had observed nothing to raise a reasonable suspicion
that Garcia may be an illegal alien. Finding no
justification for these two questions, it necessarily
follows these questions were in violation of Garcia's
Fourth Amendment rights. His responses to them will
be suppressed.
Garcia's answers to the two questions regarding his
alien status do not taint Lt. Homiak's next step of asking
Garcia to sit in the patrol car and obtaining consent to
search. As a general rule, all evidence derived from a
Fourth Amendment violation must be suppressed as a
fruit of the poisonous tree. See Costello v. United
States, 365 U.S. 265, 280 (1961): United States v.
Herrold 962 F.2d 113 U 139 (3d Cir. 1992). However,
subsequent evidence is not a fruit of the poisonous tree
if it was discovered based on an independent source.
See id. In this case, Garcia's answers to the first three
questions, his answers to the next five questions, his
demeanor, and Lt. Homiak's subsequent interview of
Noya, together provide an independent basis to support
asking Garcia to sit in the patrol car and requesting
consent to search. Disregarding the responses to the two
questions regarding alienage, this heightened detention
was supported by reasonable articuable suspicion,
based on the totality of the circumstances, that crime
may be afoot. See Hernandez, 872 F.Supp. at 1295
(citing Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491. 493-95).
In a closely analogous case, the defendant was moved
from the roadway to the patrol car during a traffic stop.
See United States v. Davis. 1995 WL 702530. at *6
(D.Del. 1995). In Davis, the defendant was driving a
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rented car, did not know the name of the primary renter,
did not know the name of his passenger, whom he could
only identify as "Have," failed to make eye contact, and
appeared unusually nervous. See id. at *2. In addition,
the passenger did not know where they were going and
did not know about the rental car. See id. This Court
ultimately upheld the search of the car obtained while
the defendant was seated in the patrol car. See id.
*8 Similarly, the totality of the circumstances observed
by Lt. Homiak reasonably supported his additional
suspicion of criminal activity. First, the primary renter
of the car was not present and neither Garcia nor Noya
knew his name. Second, Garcia knew his passenger
only as "Slim" and did not know his real name. Third,
there were several inconsistencies between Garcia's and
Noya's stories about their trip. Garcia said he was
returning from Boston to Florida after visiting his
ex-wife for one day. In contrast, Noya told Lt. Homiak
that they were traveling from Baltimore. After Lt.
Homiak explained that they were headed towards
Baltimore, Noya stated that they had been in Boston for
three days visiting a friend of Garcia's and were headed
back to Florida. Finally, Garcia was acting
progressively and unusually more nervous as the stop
continued. His hand was shaking, he repeatedly looked
over his shoulder and at the ground, he licked his lips,
and he appeared progressively more nervous,
frightened, and in despair. While it is true that any one
of these facts, taken alone, would not necessarily create
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the Court
finds that in this case, viewing the totality of the
circumstances, these facts could create in an objective
law enforcement officer a reasonable suspicion that the
defendant was engaged in criminal activity. Therefore,
Lt. Homiak did not violate the Fourth Amendment by
moving Garcia into the backseat of the patrol car for
further investigation.
4. Voluntariness of Consent to Search
Next, Garcia challenges the search of the car as being
based on involuntary consent. fFN41 The Government
must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
consent is voluntary, considering the totality of the
circumstances. See United States v. Velasquez, 885
F.2d 1076. 1081 (3dCir.l989) (citing Schneckloth v.

Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218. 222 (1973)). A
non-inclusive list of factors to evaluate are age,
education, whether defendant is told of right to refuse
consent, length of detention, repeated and prolonged
nature of questioning, and any physical punishment for
refusal to consent. See id.
FN4. Garcia consented to a search of the car
but disclaimed any ownership of the bag in the
car in which the contraband was located. Noya
verbally consented to the search of the bag.
However, the Court does not rule on the
validity of Noya's consent because Garcia has
no standing to challenge the search of a bag to
which he disclaimed all ownership. SeeRakas
v. Illinois. 439 U.S. 128. 134 (1978).
Accordingly, even if Garcia's consent is
invalid, he still has no standing to challenge
the admissibility of the contraband found in
the bag.
Garcia relies heavily on Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491
(1983). essentially arguing that forcing Garcia to sit in
the back of a locked patrol car created a coercive
atmosphere. In that case, the defendant was taken from
the airport concourse and placed in a small room with
two police officers who suspected drug smuggling. See
id. at 502. The officers held on to his tickets and
identification while asking for his consent. See id. The
officers did not give any indication that he could leave
for his airplane. See id. Finally, the officers informed
him that they had retrieved his luggage from the
airlines. See id. The Supreme Court held that the
consent to search his luggage was involuntary. See id.
However, in Hernandez, this Court distinguished Royer
and found consent to be voluntary in a case with facts
analogous to those in this case:
*9 Aviola's request for the defendant to sit in the
patrol car does not evoke the coercive atmosphere
found in Royer and the other cases cited by
defendant. First, the encounter occurred along a
public highway, during the daytime. United States v.
Velasquez. 885 F.2d 1076. 1082 (3d Cir.1989). cert,
denied, 494 U.S. 1017. 110 S.Ct. 1321. 108L.Ed.2d
497(1990). Second, Aviola returned the defendant's
driver's license, vehicle registration, and resident
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alien card prior to obtaining the defendant's written
consent to search. This is important because the
defendant, at that time, regained control of the
documents required to leave the scene if he so
desired. See e.g., Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. at 504,
103 S.Ct. at 1328. Third, Aviola explained to the
defendant that he could refuse to consent to the
search. This is also important because, while the
Fourth Amendment does not require Aviola to notify
defendant of his right to refuse, defendant's
knowledge of his right to refuse ranks positively in
the balance of facts that may countermand a finding
of unlawful detention and government coercion. Cf.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S
.Ct.2041. 2047-2048, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).
Finally, the Court finds no evidence of threats or
coercion by Aviola in asking the defendant to enter
the patrol car or to give his consent once inside.
Aviola did not unholster his weapon and apparently
took pains to insure that the defendant understood his
right to refuse to consent.
***
The circumstances of Aviola's and defendant's
interaction during the stop establish that Hernandez
could understand English. Defendant replied to
Aviola's questions in English, including a statement
in English to the effect of "[s]ure, go ahead and
search my car." From these statements, the Court also
concludes that the defendant understood Aviola's
instruction that the defendant could refuse to consent.
Further, to ensure defendant's understanding, Aviola
provided a Spanish language consent to search form,
which the defendant appeared to read before he
signed it. The defendant never indicated that he did
not or could not understand that he was consenting to
a search.... Finally, the Court finds no evidence that
Aviola would have detained the defendant further if
he did refuse to consent to the search. Cf. Florida v.
Rover. 460 U.S. 491, 503, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1327,75
L.Ed.2d 229 (1983).
The Court further finds that Aviola did not apply any
physical duress or coercion to induce defendant's
consent. No evidence suggests that Aviola subjected
the defendant to repeated or prolonged questioning.
The Court also finds that, if anything, Aviola's return
of the defendant's drivers license, vehicle registration,
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and resident alien card lessened any adverse
psychological impact of asking defendant to sit in the
patrol car. Cf Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. at 504, 103
S.Ct. at 1328 ("by returning his ticket and driver's
license, and informing him that he was free to go if he
so desired, the officers may have obviated any claim
that the encounter was anything but a consensual
matter from start to finish"). In sum, under the totality
of the circumstances, the Court finds that the
defendant voluntarily consented to the request to
search his vehicle.
*10 Hernandez. 872 F.Supp. at 1295-97.
Likewise, even though Garcia was placed in the
backseat of a locked patrol car, the totality of the
circumstances did not evoke a coercive atmosphere.
First, the encounter occurred during the daytime. Also,
Garcia initially gave verbal consent in English. Then,
Lt. Homiak returned the license and rental agreement to
Garcia before asking him to read and sign the written
consent form, which militates against sitting in the back
of the patrol car. In addition, Lt. Homiak informed
Garcia that he had the right to refuse to consent. [FN 51
Lt. Homiak offered Garcia a consent form in either
Spanish and English. Garcia chose the Spanish form
and appeared to take some time reading the form before
signing it. He never indicated he did not understand
what he was reading or signing. Also, the Court finds
no evidence of physical or mental intimidation by Lt.
Homiak. The Court also finds no evidence that Lt.
Homiak would not have terminated the encounter had
Garcia refused consent. Garcia responded
spontaneously to all verbal communications and did not
appear to have any trouble understanding what was
being said. Finally, Garcia was age 51 at the time of the
stop and had extensive prior experience with the
criminal justice system. Based on the totality of the
circumstances, the Court concludes that Garcia's
consent was voluntary.
FN5. The defendant argues that the acts of
returning the license and rental agreement and
telling Garcia he had the right to refuse
consent are not relevant to the analysis
because they occurred after he had already
given verbal consent in English. However, this
argument was rejected by this Court's decision
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in Hernandez where the officer performed the
same acts after obtaining verbal consent but
before requesting written consent. See id. at
1291. Moreover, the fact that Lt. Homiak
asked for consent twice in two different
languages, once verbal and once written, is
indicative of voluntariness.
5. Post-Arrest Waiver of Miranda Rights
Next, Garcia challenges the admissibility of his
post-arrest statements as being in violation of his
Miranda rights. In his motion, Garcia argues that "he
did not receive effective advisement of his Miranda
rights and/or that he did not knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waive those rights as he understood
them." D.I. 28 at % 18. However, Garcia has failed to
brief this argument. Therefore, he is deemed to have
waived this challenge.
Nonetheless, the Court concludes that the challenge has
no merit. The defendant made statements at two points
following his arrest. First, he made a statement
regarding payment for transport of drugs to Boston in
response to a question by Lt. Homiak while sitting in
the back of the patrol car after being arrested. Second,
he made several statements at Troop 9 while being
questioned by Lt. Homiak, Sgt. Ogden, and Agent
Miller. There is no dispute that, at both times, Garcia
was subject to custody and interrogation, thus triggering
his Miranda rights. See Leese, 176 F.3d at 743.
First, Garcia received effective advisement of his
Miranda rights before he made any statement. In the
police cruiser, Lt. Homiak read Garcia his rights from
a card. Lt. Homiak asked him if he understood those
rights and Garcia said that he did. Later, at Troop 9,
before interviewing Garcia, Lt. Homiak reminded
Garcia of his Miranda rights and stated that they were
still in effect. Garcia indicated that he understood those
rights. There is no evidence in the record that Garcia
was unable to understand the rights as they were read to
him. At all times he appeared to have a clear
understanding of the English language. He never
indicated that he did not comprehend what was being
said. The Court concludes he received effective advice
of his rights.

*11 Second, Garcia made a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights when he made
his statements. See Moran v.. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,
421 (1986); United States v. Tyler, 164 F.3d 150, 156
(3dCir.l998). First, Garcia only spoke after the officers
asked him if he wished to speak and Garcia informed
the officers that he did. Second, Garcia gave no
indication that he did not understand the rights or the
fact that he was waiving them. Third, Garcia was 51
years old and had extensive experience with the
criminal justice system. Fourth, Garcia appeared to be
coherent and did not have any trouble communicating.
Fifth, Garcia was not physically restrained, beyond
being handcuffed while in the patrol car, at any time
during the questioning. Sixth, Garcia never attempted to
invoke any of his Miranda rights. Finally, the defendant
does not assert, and the Court does not find, evidence of
ill-treatment or threats by any officer. Thus, the Court
finds that defendant made a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. Accordingly,
Garcia's motion to suppress his statements on the above
named grounds will be denied.
B. Fourteenth Amendment Challenges
1. Equal Protection Clause
Garcia requests that the Court suppress all evidence
obtained against him because of selective enforcement
of the law, based on his race, ethnicity, or national
origin,JTN6J and by burdening his fundamental right to
travel, in violation of the Equal Protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. TFN71 Specifically, Garcia
alleges that Lt. Homiak ordered Garcia to exit his car
and subjected him to more intense questioning based on
his race and/or because he was from Florida. TFN81
Garcia asserts, that at the very least, he is entitled to
additional discovery of Lt. Homiak's traffic stop records
to determine whether there is a pattern of Lt. Homiak
using constitutionally forbidden factors, "such as race,
sex, nationality or culture, skin color, or state of
residence" in deciding whether to order drivers out of
their cars during traffic stops. See D.I. 35 at 16. The
Court holds that Garcia has not made any showing to
warrant discovery or to prove that Garcia's Equal
Protection rights were violated.

© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Not Reported in F.Supp.2d
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2000 WL 654377 (D.Del.)
(Cite as: 2000 WL 654377 (D.Del.))

FN6. Garcia is of Hispanic descent. To be
more concise, the term "race" will be used to
refer generally to race, ethnicity, or national
origin.
FN7. The Equal Protection Clause provides
that: "No state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."
FN8. At the suppression hearing, Garcia
appeared to frame his Equal Protection
argument as challenging the decision to stop
Garcia's car. However, after being unable to
adduce any evidence that either officer knew
Garcia's or Noya's race or state of origin at the
time of the traffic stop, Garcia has recast his
claims in terms of the decision to ask Garcia
out of his car.
The police procedure challenged in this case—ordering
the suspect to exit the car during a traffic stop-is a
"facially neutral" policy because it does not expressly
involve a racial (or other suspect) classification or a
classification based upon state of origin. See Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252,265 (1977); United
States v. Pern. 788 F.2d 100. 116 (3d Cir.1986).
However, the Equal Protection Clause "prohibits
selective enforcement" of a facially neutral policy based
on a suspect's race or his state of origin. See Whren, 517
U.S. at 813 (1996). In order to prove selective
enforcement of the law, Garcia must show that he was
ordered out of his car based upon a discriminatory
purpose. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 118 U.S. 356, 373
(1886): Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 263; Stehnev v.
Pern. 101 F.3d 925.938 (3d Cir.1996). In order to find
discriminatory intent, the Court may consider evidence
of disparate impact, such as a statistical pattern of
ordering suspects of one race out of cars during traffic
stops. See, e.g., Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
*12 The Government urges the Court to follow the lead
of several other courts and apply the United States v.
Armstrong. 517 U.S. 456 (1996), test for allowance of
discovery from a selective prosecution case to this
selective enforcement case. [FN9] See United States v.
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Nwarro-Camacho. 186 F.3d 701. 711 (6th Cir.1999):
United States v. Bell. 86 F.3d 820. 823 (8th Cir.1996):
United States v. Bullock, 94 F.3d 896. 899 (4th
Cir.1996); United States v. Garcia. 1999 WL 318363.
at *2 (D.Kan. 1999); Chavez v. Illinois. 27 F.Supp.2d
1053, 1066 (N.D.IU. 1998) (civil case). In Armstrong,
the Supreme Court set a high threshold for obtaining
discovery in a selective prosecution case. See
Armstrong. 517 U.S. at 465. The defendant must prove
that: (1) similarly situated suspects of a different race
violated the law and were not prosecuted; and (2) the
prosecutor's decision to prosecute was based at least
partially upon race. See id. The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals has not decided whether to adopt this test for
selective enforcement cases.
FN9. Although courts sometimes use the terms
selective prosecution and selective
enforcement interchangeably, they are
fundamentally different. Selective prosecution
is a challenge to the prosecutor's decision
whether and how to charge the defendant.
Selective enforcement is a challenge to the
actions of other state officers in determining
against whom to enforce the laws.
However, this Court need not reach the issue of
employing Armstrong or formulating a separate
standard for a selective enforcement case because, in
this case, Garcia has made absolutely no showing of
either discriminatory intent or effect so as to warrant
discovery. Garcia's sole basis for asserting
discrimination is an inconsistency between Lt. Homiak's
andCpl Szafraksi's testimony. Lt. Homiak testified that
it was his habit to ask every stopped driver to exit the
car. In contrast, Cpl. Szafraksi testified that, on every
day he worked with Lt. Homiak, Lt. Homiak asked only
about 30% of the drivers to exit the car. Garcia argues
that this discrepancy shows that Lt. Homiak does not
ask every driver to exit his car, that he uses a
"conscious though [sic] process" to determine whom to
ask oul of his car, and that he is "hiding the real
motivation(s) as to why he asks certain drivers to exit
their cars." D.I. 41 at 16.
However, this discrepancy alone provides no proof of,
nor does it raise any suspicion of, discriminatory intent
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or effect by Lt. Homiak. No testimony was developed
to demonstrate that the drivers asked out of their cars on
that day, or on any other day, were predominantly of a
particular race or state of origin. Moreover, both Lt.
Homiak and Cpl. Szafraksi articulated several
race-neutral reasons for deciding when to ask drivers to
exit their cars, including officer safety, traffic noise, or
suspicious license, vehicle, or insurance information.
Lt. Homiak also testified that he asked Garcia to exit his
car for officer safety, due to his standing between the
car and interstate highway, and because of traffic noise,
which made oral communication difficult. The record
contains no evidence that race or state of origin was
ever a factor in asking Garcia, or any other driver, to
exit his car. Therefore, the record does not raise any
suspicion that Lt. Homiak has a pattern of deciding
whom to ask out of the car based on race or state of
origin, so as to allow discovery into his practices.
*13 Because the record contains not a shred of
evidence to even raise suspicion sufficient to support
Garcia's claim of racial or state of origin discrimination,
the Court will deny Garcia's request for discovery and
deny his motion to suppress the evidence on these
grounds.

favor of citizens of its own. See Supreme Court of New
Hampshire v. Piper. 470 U.S. 274. 277 (1985);
Maldonado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 190, n. 9 (3d
Cir.1998). As discussed above, the record contains no
evidence, and raises no suspicion, that Lt. Homiak
discriminated against Garcia, or any other driver, based
on his state of origin. Therefore, on this ground,
Garcia's request for discovery and motion to suppress
evidence will be denied.
IV. Conclusion
Based on the facts adduced from the suppression
hearing and for the reasons given above, the Court will:
(1) deny Garcia's request to take additional discovery;
(2) enter an order suppressing Garcia's statements
concerning his country of origin and that he did not
have any immigration paperwork or an alien card; and
(3) deny Garcia's motion to suppress as to all other
evidence.
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2000 WL 654377 (D.Del.)
END OF DOCUMENT

2. Privileges and Immunities Clause
In addition, Garcia seeks to have the evidence
suppressed because of violations of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
TFN101 No case has been cited and the Court has
located no case which indicates that a violation of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause would be an
appropriate basis for suppressing evidence in a criminal
case. Nonetheless, the Court need not reach this issue
because there has been no showing that this clause was
even violated.
FN 10. The Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment states that "No
state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States."
The Privileges and Immunities clause prevents a State
from discriminating against citizens of another state in
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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c
Justice Court, Village of Roslyn Harbor,
County of Nassau.
The PEOPLE of the State of New York,
v.
The ENGINEERS COUNTRY CLUB, INC.,
Defendant.
No. 01-03.
June 23, 2003.
In a prosecution of a country club for violating an
ordinance precluding the playing of outdoor music or
the use of an outdoor public address system, the Justice
Court, Village of Roslyn Harbor, County of Nassau,
David H. Pfeffer, J., held that the ordinance did not
violate the club's free speech or Equal Protection rights.
Ordered accordingly.
West Headnotes
iU Constitutional Law €=>90.1(1)
92k90.1(n Most Cited Cases
HI Zoning and Planning 0=>76
414k76 Most Cited Cases
Content-neutral zoning ordinance precluding the
playing of outdoor music or the use of an outdoor
public address system did not violate country club's
First Amendment free speech rights, despite lack of any
decibel limitation or unreasonable noise prohibition; the
ordinance applied to a substantial government interest,
i.e. protecting the tranquility of residents in their homes,
and given the undisputed and substantially unimpeded
right of the club to play live or amplified music indoors,
an alternative avenue of communication was provided.
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 1.
121 Constitutional Law €=>228.2
92k228.2 Most Cited Cases
[21 Zoning and Planning 0=^76
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414k76 Most Cited Cases
Content-neutral zoning ordinance precluding the
playing of outdoor music or the use of an outdoor
public address system did not violate country club's
Equal Protection rights; there was a rational basis for
establishing specific regulations on noise likely to occur
as a result of the catering and other activities of the
club. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.
Karl C. Seman, Esq., counsel for defendant.
Michael A. Montesano, Village Prosecutor.
JUDGMENT%h
DAVID H. PFEFFER, Village Justice.
*1 The defendant, a local country club, stands accused
of violating a local law precluding the playing of
outdoor music or the use of an outdoor public address
system.
When the matter came onto the calendar for trial on
May 19, 2003, the defendant, appearing through
counsel, sought leave to file a motion dismissing the
Information because of alleged unconstitutionality of
the Village ordinance and/or because the Information
was allegedly defective, the motion not yet having been
served and filed, and no earlier motion to stay having
been made.
The defendant's plea of not guilty in lieu of formal
arraignment was served on March 11, 2003. The case
was set for trial to begin on April 14, 2003. That trial
date was then adjourned at defendant's request to May
19,2003. Thus, the motion to dismiss was sought to be
filed more than 45 days after the plea in lieu of
arraignment. Under CPL § 255.20(3), this Court was
free to summarily deny the motion. Nevertheless, the
Court, in the interest ofjustice, decided to proceed with
the trial on the merits, and entertain the motion, insofar
as it related to alleged unconstitutionality of the Village
ordinance, subject to permitting the People an
opportunity to respond to the motion within about four
weeks. While the motion also asserted a request for
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dismissal because of an alleged defective information,
no basis for relief was set forth and the supporting
papers merely asked for dismissal for alleged
unconstitutionality.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion to dismiss
the information is denied and the defendant is found
guilty of violating the Village ordinance as charged.
The Village Ordinance Involved
The defendant is charged with violating Roslyn Harbor
Village Zoning Code Section 6-1.3 subsection a., item
v.
Section 6-1.3 is entitled "Supplemental regulations for
use in residential districts" subsection a, of which Item
v is a part, is entitled "Private recreational clubs and
outdoor recreational uses" and sets forth an overall
scheme for the protection of surrounding residents. Item
i of subsection a. requires interior areas of such clubs to
be sufficiently sound insulated or separated from
adjacent residential structures so as to avoid "noise
nuisance." Item ii requires that the appearance of any
structure not be out of character or scale with the
neighborhood. Item iii requires suitable screening or
buffering adjacent to residential use areas. Item iv
restricts intensive outdoor activity and restricts the
location of outdoor service facilities. Items viii, ix and
x restrict the location of swimming pools, equipment
and parking with regard to surrounding residences. Item
xii restricts outdoor lighting so as not to impinge on
residential property. At issue here is Item v which
provides "No outdoor music or public address system
shall be provided." In context, the word "outdoor" was
intended to apply to both "music" and "public address
system." No prohibition of Item v applies to indoor
activities.
Tlte Nature of Defendant and its Accused Activity
*2 The defendant is a private country club located
within a residential district and surrounded entirely by
private residences. The defendant is expressly accused
of violating the provision of the zoning ordinance by
having an activity conducted outdoors with a live band
on July 14, 2002. In the course of questioning by the
Court, the defendant has indicated a desire and
intention to continue a practice of providing outdoor
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music including associated amplification.
The Nature of Defendant's Constitutional
Challenge
Defendant contends that the Village zoning law
provision violates the "Freedom of Speech" provision
of the U.S. Constitution, i.e. the First Amendment. At
the same time, defendant in its paper concedes that the
restriction of the zoning ordinance is "content-neutral."
In addition, defendant asserts first that defendant is
denied "due process of law" and then asserts that the
ordinance "is a denial of equal protection under the law
and therefore unconstitutional." To the extent it can be
understood, defendant's equal protection/due process
argument is based upon the fact that the outdoor live
music, outdoor amplification ban applies only to private
recreational clubs within residential districts of which
defendant is the only one, and not to other private
residents living in their homes surrounding the
defendant club.
The Legal Criteria Used to Decide First Amendment
Challenges to Statutes
The Supreme Court of the United States has
established the criteria to be used in considering a First
Amendment challenge to a statute. In U.S. v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367. 376. 88 S.Ct. 1673. 20 L.Ed.2d 672
(1968), Ihe Supreme Court stated: "when speech and
non-speech elements are combined in the same course
of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating the non-speech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468
U.S. 288. 293. 104 S.Ct. 3065. 82 L.Ed.2d221 (1984).
the Supreme Court stated: "Expression, whether oral or
written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to
reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions. We have
often noled that restrictions of this kind are valid
provided they are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly
targeted to serve a significant government interest, and
that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information." The Supreme Court
has also noted that local governments have "a
substantial interest in protecting its citizens from
unwelcome noise." City Council of Los Angeles v.
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Tavpavers for Vincent 466 U.S. 789, 806, 104 S.Ct.
2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). See also, Care\< v.
Brown. 447 U.S. 455.471, 100 S.Ct. 2286.65 L.Ed.2d
263 (1980) where the Court said the government's
interest in "protecting the well-being, tranquility, and
privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in
a free and civilized society."
The Supreme Court of the United States has also
described the right of residential privacy, i.e. the right
of a citizen in his home to be free from the intrusion of
unwanted speech, and the important governmental
interest in protecting against such intrusion. See Frisbv
v. Schultz. 487 U.S. 474. 484- 5. 108 S.Ct. 2495. 101
L.Ed.2d 420 (1988):
*3 One important aspect of residential privacy is
protection ofthe unwilling listener. Although in many
locations, we expect individuals simply to avoid
speech they do not want to hear, the home is different
... special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy
within their own walls, which the State may legislate
to protect, is an ability to avoid intrusions. Thus, we
have repeatedly held that individuals are not required
to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes
and that the government may protect this freedom.
See also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87, 69
S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949), where the Court said
that "the unwilling listener is not like the passer-by who
may be offered a pamphlet in the street but cannot be
made to take it. In his home or on the street he is
practically helpless to this interference with his privacy
by loud speakers except through the protection of the
municipality."
There is no requirement, as long as the ordinance is
content-neutral, for a court to second guess the
municipality in determining whether the scheme
selected constitutes the least intrusive or least restrictive
means available for effectuating the governmental
interest. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 798. 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989).
Application of the Constitutional Standard to this
Case
ril We can assume music is a form of speech that is
subject to First Amendment protection. See Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781. 790. 109 S.Ct.
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2746. 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). The ordinance at issue
here does not restrict any specific content of the music.
Indeed defendant admits the ordinance is
content-neutral. (Seman Aff. % 28)
Given the admittedly content-neutral nature of the
ordinance involved, and its clear application to a
substantial government interest, i.e. protecting the
tranquility of residents in their homes, and given the
undisputed and substantially unimpeded right rFNll of
the defendant to play live or amplified music indoors,
thereby providing an alternative avenue of
communication, the ordinance is presumptively valid.
See City ofRenton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S.
41. 47. 106 S.Ct. 925. 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986).
FN1. The only restriction on indoor activities
it that the areas be sufficiently sound-insulated
or separated from adjacent residential
structures. Village Ordinance § 6-1.3a.i.
The defendant's primary challenge appears to be that
some decibel limitation or unreasonable noise
prohibition might have been more appropriate than an
absolute ban on outdoor music or outdoor
amplification. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit has stated that there is no constitutional
prohibition against a ban on amplification, provided
there is a basis for such a ban. See Housing Works, Inc.
v. Kerik. 283 F.3d 471. 481 (2d Cir.2002).There the
Court explained that there are inherent problems
associated with adjustment of sound volumes and
monitoring that make an absolute ban more appropriate.
See also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr.. 512 U.S. 753.
114 S.Ct. 2516. 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994) [upholding
ban against singing, chanting, etc. in vicinity of
hospitals, even without a distinction between different
levels of noise].
Particularly on point is Carew-Reid v. Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, 903 F.2d 914 (2d Cir.1990).
There the Second Circuit held that the MTA's absolute
ban on amplified music on a subway platform passed
constitutional muster, even though the lower court
thought that a less restrictive alternative could also
eliminate the problem of offensive noise. Citing to
Supreme Court precedent, the Second Circuit noted that
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"[t]he validity of [time, place or manner] regulations
does not turn on a judge's agreement with the
responsible decision maker concerning the most
appropriate method for promoting significant
government interests." 903 F.2d at 918 (alterations in
original)(interaal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
*4 With respect to alternative means for expression,
the ordinance does not bar live music indoors, subject
only to the requirement for adequate noise insulation.
The defendant is free to perform live music, amplified
or otherwise indoors. The fact that defendant prefers
outdoor music is not relevant to constitutionality. As
noted in Carew-Reid, "The First Amendment, however,
does not guarantee appellees access to every or even the
best channels or locations for their expression." 903
F.2dat919.
The need for the Village ordinance is clear from the
testimony of Gerald Unger, a Village resident, whose
property abuts that of the defendant club. Mr. Unger
testified that because of the music being played at the
club for 1 1/2 to 2 hours, music conceded by defendants
to be live outdoor music, he and his guests were
seriously disturbed at his home.
The two cases relied on by defendant to support its
view of unconstitutionality are inapposite. In People v.
Edinger, the City Court of Long Beach struck down an
absolute prohibition on the use of power blowers, such
as leaf blowers, because the court concluded that there
was no state of facts that could be reasonably assumed
to support the ordinance as an enactment that promotes
a legitimate government interest. 179Misc.2d 104,106,
683 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Long Beach City Ct. 1998V In Kim
v. City of New York, the court sustained a public
preacher's challenge to an unnecessary noise ordinance
because the court concluded that the ordinance's
definition of unnecessary, which was defined to mean
any sound that annoys a person, was both overbroad
and vague. 774 F.Supp. 164. 169-70 (S.D.N.Y. 199IV
The Edinger case did not involve a First Amendment
issues while the Kim case went off on the issue of
whether the noise standard could be understood and
enforced.
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This Court is satisfied that the clear legislative intent to
protect residents in their homes surrounding defendant's
property is a proper motivation for the outdoor music
and amplification ban, a ban which is content-neutral.
On the basis of the authorities discussed above, the
challenge to constitutionality of the Village ordinance
based upon First Amendment considerations is
overruled.
The Equal Protection Challenge
[2] The Equal Protection clause requires states to treat
all similarly situated people alike. City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Livinz Ctr.. 473 U.S. 432. 439. 105 S.Ct.
3249. 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). An equal protection
challenge to an economic or social regulation is subject
to a rational basis review since a legislative enactment
carries a strong presumption of constitutionality. This
strong presumption of constitutionality can be
overcome only by showing "beyond a reasonable doubt
that there was no rational basis for the adoption of the
local law here at issue." Town of N. Hempstead v.
Exxon Corp.. 53 N.Y.2d 747. 749. 439 N.Y.S.2d 342.
421 N.E.2d 834 (1981V
Equal protection claims brought by a "class of one"
may be successful where this "class of one" "has been
intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated and that there is no rational basis for the
difference in treatment." Village of Willowbrook v.
Oleck 528 U.S. 562.564. 120 S.Ct. 1073.145 L.Ed.2d
1060 (2000) (per curium) (holding that a property
owner stated an Equal Protection claim against a village
which demanded a 3 3-foot easement in order to connect
the property owner to the municipal water supply where
the village demanded a 15-foot easement from other
similarly situated property owners). Since Oleck the
Second Circuit has stated that an equal protection claim
could proceed to trial if either there was no rational
basis for the discriminatory treatment received or the
action complained of was motivated by animus. Harlen
Assoc, v. Incorporated Village of Mineola, 273 F.3d
494. 5Q0(2dCir.2001) (holding that a zoning board's
denial of a special use permit for a convenience store
did not state an equal protection claim because of the
Board's legitimate concern that the convenience store
would encourage nearby school children to cross a busy
intersection).
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*5 Although the ordinance challenged here applies
only to this defendant, the only private recreational club
within the Village, absent a showing of animus or
ill-will on the part of the Village, the equal protection
question is whether the Village has a rational basis for
discriminating against outdoor music and public
address systems on the defendant's property.
The nature of defendant's activities, by its own
admission places it in a unique position in comparison
to its surrounding residential neighbor. Private
recreational clubs are the only entities permitted by the
Village to engage on a regular basis in a residentially
zoned area in the business of catering various affairs
involving large groups of people and the playing of
music, including weddings, showers, bar and bat
mitzvahs, christenings, anniversaries, birthdays, mother
and father day celebrations, golf and tennis outings,
meetings, fund raisers, memorials, and concerts. Seman
Aff. | f 11,13. Otherwise, the only other permitted uses
in residentially zoned areas within the Village are single
family detached dwellings, municipal uses, places of
worship, schools, and outdoor recreational uses. None
of the permitted uses, other than private recreational
clubs, cater to such affairs on a regular basis. No other
entities, other than private recreational clubs, have a
desire or incentive to hold such affairs outdoors on a
regular basis.
Both cases cited by defendant in support of its
argument are inapposite because such cases involved
regulations discriminating on the basis of content. In
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 498 U.S. 92
(1972) and Carev v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 100 S.Ct.
2286. 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980). the challenged
regulations distinguished among different classes of
speech on the basis of content. The challenged
regulation in Mosley prohibited all forms of picketing
near schools, except for peaceful labor picketing was
held to be a content based distinction that violated the
Equal Protection clause. The challenged regulation in
Carey prohibited all forms of picketing of residences,
except for the peaceful picketing of a place of
employment. The court held that the distinction
between the picketing of a place of employment and
other forms of picketing was a content-based distinction
that violated the Equal Protection clause.
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Here, the Court finds that there was a rational basis for
establishing specific regulations on noise likely to occur
as a result of the catering and other activities of the
defendant club. No motive other than that has been
established. No ill will or animus toward the defendant
has even been suggested. As a result, the defendant has
failed to sustain its burden of establishing invalidity on
the basis of constitutional equal protection.
The challenge to constitutionality of the Village
ordinance based upon equal protection considerations
is overruled.
The motion to dismiss the Information is denied.
Decision on the Merits
*6 At the trial, the court heard the testimony of Mr.
Unger referred to above. The Court also accepted as an
admission of defendant, the statement in paragraph 19
of the Attorney Affirmation by Karl C. Seman,
defendant's counsel, as expressly verified by David
Shaw, the defendant's General Manager and authorized
corporate agent:
"19. On July 14, 2002 the ECC [abbreviation used
for defendant Engineers Country Club, Inc.] did
sponsor its annual 4th of July celebration where the
evening culminated with music performed outdoors
by a live band."
The defendant is therefore found guilty of violating
Roslyn Harbor Zoning Ordinance § 6-1.3, subsection a.,
item v. The defendant is ordered to appear for
sentencing on July 21, 2003 at 7:30 p.m.
Not Reported in N.Y.S.2d, 2003 WL 21537412
(N.Y.Just.Ct), 2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 51069(U)
END OF DOCUMENT
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